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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Academic  conflict  research,  deeply  rooted  in  Cold  War  thinking,  has  traditionally 
focused on the causes of war between states, with an analytical focus  on the role of 
military  alliances,  joint  land  borders,  arms  races,  nuclear  deterrence,  trade  relations, 
democracy levels, balances and imbalances of power, and the like.
1 Control over disputed 
territory has been the most frequent issue of international violent dissent among states.
2 
After the end of the Cold War, international relations scholars studying violent conflict 
noticed that since 1945, the most common and lethal form of organized violence was 
                                                 
+ Paper prepared for the interdisciplinary conference on “The Roots of Civil War and Conflicts and their 
Influence on Transformations of State and Civil Society Institutions” at the Department of Border Region 
Studies, University of Southern Denmark, 14-15 November 2008. 
* PhD. Student, Department of Government, University of Essex, UK & Teaching Fellow, Department of 
Social Science (Comparative Politics), University of Oldenburg, Germany. I would like to thank Halvard 
Buhaug and Clionadh Raleigh for sharing data with me, as well as Han Dorussen and Kristian Gleditsch for 
helpful comments. 
1 For reviews of this literature see, for example, J.A  Vasquez, What do We Know about War? (Rowman 
and Littlefield, New York, 2000); and M. Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook of War Studies II (University of 
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2000). 
2 K.J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989 (Cambridge University 
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intra- rather than interstate war. Although in general less severe than interstate conflicts, 
90% of all battle deaths since the end of the Cold War have been due to civil wars.  
 
The early 1990s have seen a wave of civil wars in the Balkans, on the territory of the 
former Soviet Union, in large parts of Asia and in Western, Central and Eastern Africa. 
By the high water mark of 1994, more than a quarter of the states in the world were 
experiencing civil war, waging on average for six years.
3 According to some scholars, 
this prevalence of civil wars should be treated as an entirely new phenomenon.
4  
 
From 1945 to 1999, about 130 civil wars have killed up to 20 million and displaced up to 
70 million people in more than 70 countries worldwide.
 5 In the same time period, „only‟ 
25 interstate wars with roughly 3 million battle related deaths were counted. Civil wars 
tend to last longer than interstate conflicts, are less likely to end by formal settlement, and 
often tend to recur.
6 In addition, two thirds of these intrastate conflicts are fought along 
                                                 
3 The higher numbers of civil wars in the 1990s result from a gradual accumulation of conflicts since World 
War II, not because the rate of civil war outbreak increased with the end of the Cold War. The rate of 
outbreak of civil conflict is, on average, about 2.31 per year since 1945. Civil conflicts break out at a faster 
rate than they die. J. Fearon and D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, 97 American Political 
Science Review (2003), 75-90; H. Hegre, “The Duration and Termination of Civil War”, 41 Journal of 
Peace Research (2004), 243–252. 
4 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2001). 
5 J. Fearon and D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, above note 3; and  N. Sambanis, “Using 
Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War”, 2 Perspectives on Politics (2004), 259-279. 
Fearon states that “a civil war is a violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to 
take power at the center or in a region, or to change government policies”. J. Fearon, “Iraq's Civil War”, 86 
Foreign Affairs (2007). The exact number of civil wars and related deaths very much depend on the data set 
employed. Most civil war lists rely on the updated Correlates of War (COW) project, a database widely 
used by quantitative scholars of conflict. J.D. Singer and M. Small, The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A 
Statistical Handbook (John Wiley, New York, 1972). COW classifies civil wars as having over 1,000 war-
related casualties per year of conflict. Other data sets use lower death thresholds to code a civil war onset in 
a given year, such as the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. See N.P. Gleditsch, P. Wallensteen, M. 
Eriksson, M. Sollenberg and S. Havard, “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset”, 39 Journal of Peace 
Research (2002), 615-637. 
6 H. Hegre, “The Duration and Termination of Civil War”, above note 3. JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    3 
 
ethnic lines
7, meaning that the resulting violence is not indiscriminate in nature, but 
targeted  against  (non -)members  of  certain  identity  g roups,  defined  for  example   by 
language, religion, appearance or territorial attachment. 
 
This development has led to a rapidly growing quantitative literature on civil war to 
identify correlates of onset, duration and termination in general and globally, both from 
an International Relations (IR) and a Comparative Politics (CP) perspective in poli tical 
science. In addition, scholars from the fields of development economics and international 
political economy have started to systematically research causes and consequences of 
civil wars, and important empirical patterns have been uncovered. 
 
At least 50 systematic studies on factors related to civil war onset, duration, termination 
or recurrence have appeared in the last five to ten years
8, far outnumbering the output of 
former decades.
9 While agreeing that civil war is mainly a  result of poverty  and less 
economically developed countries
10, other factors possibly correlated with the outbreak 
of violence within states, such as ethnicity, remain highly disputed.  
 
Despite the growing academic awareness, civil wars in general and ethnic conflicts in 
particular are still a poorly understood phenomenon.
11 Although ethnic civil wars could 
                                                 
7 N. Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical 
Inquiry (Part 1)”, 45 Journal of Conflict Resolution (2001), 259-282. 
8 With “systematic” I refer to studies applying quantitative research designs in the form of multivariate 
statistics and regression analysis, aiming to uncover empirical regularities across a large sample of cases of 
civil war, usually all civil wars since 1945. 
9 Sambanis provides a detailed review of the quantitative literature. N.  Sambanis, “A Review of Recent 
Advances and Future Directions in the Literature on Civil War”, 13 Defense and Peace Economics (2002), 
215–243. 
10 P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars”, 56 Oxford Economic Papers (2004), 
563-595; J. Fearon and D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, above note 3. 
11 An ethnic conflict is a civil war where the recruitment of fighters and the resulting kind of violence is 
structured  along  ethnic  lines,  according  to  Sambanis.  See  N.  Sambanis,  What  is  an  Ethnic  War? 
Organization and Interests in Insurgencies (Unpublished Paper, Yale University, 2006).  This does not 
mean that the root cause of the conflict is ethnicity or ethnic heterogeneity. Quite the contrary, once the JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    4 
 
be regarded as following a fundamentally different logic to that of non-ethnic ones
12, and 
as complex power struggles between identity groups embedded in a deep historic and 
geographic context
13, conventional quantitative research continues to treat them either as 
non-existent
14 or as country-specific events that can be studied in isolation  from each 
other
15. 
 
Most large-N statistical studies of (ethnic) civil war have focused on  country-level 
characteristics to predict the onset of a conflict in a given year
16, or have focused on 
duration as the dependent variable
17. This literature has produced insightful empirical 
patterns on factors related to the outbreak of conflict. However, t he global statistical 
approach to explaining civil wars has met with criticism  recently, mainly because of 
concerns over theoretical and methodological shortcomings. Quantitative studies have 
been frequently criticized for their failure to capture the inte rnal dynamics of civil wars 
by aggregating at too high a level of analysis, which has led to the emergence of a second 
                                                                                                                                                 
conflict has started, it becomes important to which real or imagined ethnic group people belong. For a 
review of the literature on ethnic conflict and nationalism, see R. Brubaker and D. Laitin, “Ethnic and 
Nationalist Violence”, 4 Annual Review of Sociology (1998), 423-452. 
12 N. Sambanis, What is an Ethnic War?, above note 11; See also N. Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic 
Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?”, above note 7; T.R. Gurr, Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in 
the New Century (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 2000); T.R. Gurr, Minorities at 
Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 
1993).  
13 L.-E.  Cederman  and  L.  Girardin,  “Beyond  Fractionalization:  Mapping  Ethnicity  onto  Nationalist 
Insurgencies”, 101 American Political Science Review (2007), 173-185; N. Sambanis, “Using Case Studies 
to Expand Economic Models of Civil War”, above note 5; N. Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil 
Wars Have the Same Causes?”, above note 7. 
14 J. Mueller, “The Banality of Ethnic War”, 25 International Security (2000), 42-70. 
15 J. Fearon and D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, above note 3; P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, 
“Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars”, above note 10. 
16 P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars”, above note 10; J. Fearon and D.Laitin, 
“Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, above note 3. 
17 P. Collier, A. Hoeffler and M. Söderbom, “On the Duration of Civil War”, 41 Journal of Peace Research 
(2004), 253–273; H. Hegre, “The Duration and Termination of Civil War”, above note 3; J. Fearon, “Why 
do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?” 41 Journal of Peace Research (2004), 275-301. JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    5 
 
generation of empirically downscaled civil war studies. This second generation uses new 
disaggregated  data  on  exact  conflict  location,  and  disaggregates  key  variables  within 
states to overcome previous shortcomings. The aim of this paper is to review some of the 
methodological problems of the conventional quantitative literature on civil war, and to 
highlight  heuristically  promising  new  research  avenues  that  share  a  joint  logic  of 
disaggregating theory, research design and data on civil war.     
 
The article proceeds as follows. Part II reviews of the most important statistical models 
employed in the quantitative literature on civil war and ethnic conflict to date, while Part 
III  highlights  methodological  and  theoretical  problems  with  this  „first  generation‟  of 
quantitative studies. The need for empirically and theoretically disaggregated studies and 
data  sets  in  terms  of  different  actor  constellations  and  conflict  types,  especially 
secessionist conflicts, is discussed. Next, I illustrate my arguments about the promises of 
disaggregated studies with the example of the Bosnian conflict of 1992-1995, and show 
preliminary data on (i)  variation in regional victimization patterns within Bosnia, (ii) 
local-level differences between different types of violence that have occurred and (iii) 
temporal variation in the severity of the conflict. Section V offers some conclusions.   
 
 
II.  CONVENTIONAL MACRO-QUANTITATIVE STUDIES OF CIVIL WAR AND ETHNIC 
CONFLICT: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 
 
In the following, I limit myself to the studies that model the onset of a conflict. However, 
one  should  keep  in  mind  that  we  are  in  the  rather  remarkable  situation  now  that 
regression models that try to explain the onset of a conflict cannot explain its duration or 
its termination, and vice versa.
18 
                                                 
18 This might be one additional reason why quantitative studies of civil war are not taken very seriously by 
policymakers and the policy community, and why large-N statistical work on conflict issues has a rather 
low reputation outside the academic world. See Andrew Mack, “Civil War: Academic Research and the 
Policy Community”, 39 Journal of Peace Research (2002), 515-525 for the original argument and further 
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Macro-level variables that are identified as being correlated with the onset of a civil war 
have been theoretically  subsumed  as  either „greed‟ or „grievance‟  related.
19 Scholarly 
analysis supports the conclusion that individual economic opportunity, where rebellion is 
modelled as an industry that generates profits from looting of valuable resources („greed‟), 
are more important for the occurrence of a conflict than political repression or exclusion 
of  ethnic  groups  from  state  power  („grievances‟).  This  means  that  a  rebellion  is  not 
explained  by  motive  but  by  the  atypical  circumstances  of  war  and  weak  states  that 
generate profitable opportunities for some individuals, who are in sum little more than 
thugs or quasi-criminals “doing well out of war”.
20 
 
 
A.  The Collier-Hoeffler (CH) Model  
 
The CH model, which has become the standard econometric model for predicting civil 
war outbreak, uses a data set of 78 civil wars over the period 1960–99 and estimates the 
risk of onset in 750 five-year episodes via logit regression.
21 In general, it is found that a 
model that focuses on th e opportunities for rebellion („greed‟) performs well, whereas 
objective  indicators  of  repression  or  group  inequality  („grievances‟)  have  little 
explanatory power. Factors that were shown to have statistically significant effects on the 
opportunity for rebellion  in any given five-year period were the availability of finance, 
low opportunity costs of rebellion, military advantage through rough terrain, population 
size and time elapsed since the previous conflict. 
 
                                                 
19 See, for example, P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars”, above note 10; J. 
Fearon and D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, above note 3. 
20 P. Collier, “Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity”, 44 Journal of Conflict Resolution (2000), 839–53. 
21 For a more detailed review of the CH model and its different versions, see P.  Collier, A. Hoeffler and N. 
Sambanis, “The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design”, 
in P. Collier and N. Sambanis (eds.), Understanding Civil War, Vol. I (The World Bank, Washington, DC, 
2005).  JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    7 
 
A high proportion of primary commodities in national exports significantly increases the 
risk of a conflict. A country with commodities comprising 32% of gross domestic product 
has  a  22%  higher  chance  of  falling  into  civil  war  than  a  country  with  no  primary 
commodity exports. Another source of finance is diasporas which can fund rebellions and 
insurgencies from abroad, and which substantially increase the risk of conflict renewal. In 
terms  of  the  low  opportunity  costs  argument  of  rebellion,  male  secondary  education 
enrolment,  per  capita  income,  and  the  economic  growth  rate  all  have  statistically 
significant and substantial effects that reduce the risk of conflict. Phrased another way, 
young males who make up the vast majority of combatants in civil wars are less likely to 
join a rebellion if they are receiving an education or have a comfortable salary, and can 
reasonably assume that they will prosper in the future. Finally, the risk of conflict is 
proportional to a country‟s population. A geographically dispersed population increases 
the risk of conflict and there is weak evidence to suggest that mountainous or rough 
terrain might be advantageous to rebels. A population dispersed outward towards the 
borders is harder to control than one concentrated in a central region, while mountains 
offer terrain where rebels can find sanctuary.  
 
Both  opportunities  and  grievances  increase  with  population  size,  so  this  result  is 
compatible with both the opportunity and grievance accounts. Grievances may increase 
with population because of rising heterogeneity. However, most proxies for grievance 
such as economic inequality measured by the GINI coefficient, political rights, ethnic 
polarization and religious fractionalization are insignificant. Only ethnic dominance, the 
case where the largest ethnic group comprises a majority of the population, increases the 
risk of civil war. Societies characterized by ethnic and religious diversity seem to be safer 
than homogeneous societies as long as they avoid clear dominance by one group over the 
others. Diversity makes rebellion harder because it makes rebel cohesion more costly. 
 
 
B.  The Fearon and Laitin (FL) Model 
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The second econometric study that appears prominent in the literature is the FL model, 
where much of the theorizing is influenced by thoughts of insurgency tactics and „classic‟ 
guerilla warfare in poor or weakened states. Here, the importance of rural or peripheral 
locations and rough terrain for fighting and hiding of the rebels is stressed. According to 
the authors, conflicts in populous countries last longer because larger countries contain 
larger peripheral areas that are harder to control. Geography and the type of territory is 
crucial for the „technology‟ of insurgency, in the sense that geographic conditions like 
rough terrain facilitate the operations of a rebel movement. Poor states tend to have low 
military strength or state capacity to deter and fight potential insurgents. Poverty can also 
be interpreted as direct motivation for violence, because economically underdeveloped 
states are likely to have poorer public goods provision than richer ones.  
 
Fearon and Laitin find oil abundance to be positively correlated with the onset of civil 
war, and explain their findings with a „weak states effect‟.
 22 They measure that weakness 
by national GDP per capita. Per capita income signals the available tax rate for a state to 
buy  off  and  repress  opposition.  Thus,  richer  states  are  good  at  counterinsurgencies, 
mainly  because  of  better  infrastructure.  Fearon  and  Laitin  find  no  support  for  the 
argument by Collier and Hoeffler
23 that primary commodity exports provide the moti ve 
and finance for rebellion, but  argue instead  that it is oil abundance that matters. Oil 
weakens  states  bec ause  it  dampens state  capacity,  as  oil  provides  easy  money  for 
governments which in turn fail to develop effective institutions for taxation. In ad dition, 
large populations make counterinsurgency difficult, weakening state capacity. To sum up, 
Fearon  and  Laitin  point  out  that  “most  important  for  the  prospects  of  a  nascent 
insurgency, however, are the government’s police and military capabilities and the reach 
of government institutions into rural areas”.
24 
 
                                                 
22 J. Fearon and D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, above note 3. 
23 P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars”, above note 10. 
24 J. Fearon and D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, above note 3, at 80. Emphasis in the 
original. JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    9 
 
FL use pooled logit analysis of time-series cross-sectional data covering 127 civil war 
onsets from 1945 to 1999 on 161 countries, according to their own civil war list.
25 The 
results, however, do not seem very robust when compared to e.g. Collier and Hoeffler.
26 
The FL model shares much of the logic of Collier and Hoeffler‟s „greed‟ or „opportunity‟ 
argument as a reason for taking up arms. Also rejecting „grievance‟-based explanations 
for the onset of civil war, the FL model explains upcoming intrastate violence mainly as a 
function of declining state strength, proxied by low levels of GDP per capita and by the 
availability of the technology of insurgency. The resource-predation argument and the 
role  of  lootable  resources  as  primary  commodity  exports,  so  dominant  in  CH,  are 
dismissed by FL. Instead, the oil or petroleum dependency of a government as a possible 
weak states effect is highlighted. Although the FL model seems overly state-centric, it 
shares a lot of its independent variables with previous versions of the CH model. Thus, 
many of the key findings of FL seem more or less to reinterpret the exact meaning of 
previous identified variables in the regression tables, as Sambanis
27 points out.  
 
 
C.  Problems with the ‘First Generation’ of Quantitative Studies 
 
I have already mentioned above that a direct comparison of the results obtained by large-
N quantitative work on civil war and ethnic conflict should be treated with due caution. 
The underlying data sets use different thresholds for what counts as civil war, different 
                                                 
25 See the Appendix for the full list. Sambanis makes the point that the data set used in FL already reflects a 
strong assumption of unit homogeneity which might not be adequate concerning civil wars.  Sambanis, 
“Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War”, above note 5. The FL list of civil wars 
uses  a  threshold  value  of  at  least  1,000  battle-related  deaths  to  qualify  as  war  onset,  similar  to  the 
Correlates  of  War  (COW)  criteria  (M.W.  Doyle  and  N.  Sambanis,  “International  Peacebuilding:  A 
Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis”, 94 American Political Science Review (2000), 779–801; P. Collier 
and  A.  Hoeffler,  “Greed  and  Grievance  in  Civil  Wars”,  above  note  10;  and  others).  Other  lists  with 
different codings of start and end dates were also tested by FL, resulting in no substantial differences. Yet, 
all tests are based on the relative high threshold of 1,000 battle deaths.  
26 Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars”, above note 10. 
27 Sambanis, “Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War”, above note 5.  JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    10 
 
start and end dates of single conflicts and cover different overall time periods in their 
analysis. This might also be interpreted as a lack of theoretical clarity on the very concept 
of civil war itself, and on the theoretical problem of how to disentangle civil war from 
other forms of political violence such as military coups or large scale ethnic riots. As long 
as no standard data set of all civil wars since 1945 has established itself in the literature, 
the policy impact of quantitative studies of mass level violence will continue to be rather 
limited.  
 
One major shortcoming of the CH model and other country-level studies is the inherent 
problem of an „ecological fallacy‟, meaning that inferring individual characteristics from 
group characteristics based on aggregate data can lead to very wrong conclusions. When 
inferences  about  the  nature  of  specific  individual  behaviour  are  based  solely  upon 
population-level or „ecological‟ data, the danger of falling short to an ecological fallacy is 
high. Country-level econometric studies on civil war onset all assume that national level 
averages are also representative for individuals that participate in insurgencies. This is 
unlikely to be correct, and seems more misleading the more internal variation of key 
variables there is in a state. To give an example, the conclusion that poor and uneducated 
young men are more likely to join a rebel group from observing that most armed conflicts 
take place in poor countries with low education standards is a prime case for the danger 
of an ecological fallacy.
28 In order to draw the right conclusions for the right reasons, 
                                                 
28 The classic example of an ecological inference problem is W.S. Robinson, “Ecological Correlations and 
the Behavior of Individuals”, 15 American Sociological Review (1950), 351–357. For several geographic 
districts in the US in 1930, the literacy rate and the proportion of immigrants was computed, based on 
census  data.  When  correlated,  the  two  variables  showed  a  positive  sign,  meaning  that  the  greater  the 
proportion of immigrants in a unit, the higher its average literacy rate. However, when individuals instead 
of aggregates were considered, the effect was much lower and the correlation turned negative – immigrants 
were on average less literate. The positive correlation at the aggregate level was because immigrants tended 
to  settle  in  areas  where  the  population  was  already  more  literate.  In  Human  Geography,  the  related 
Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP) is a well-known source of error that can affect spatial studies 
which use aggregate data (e.g. D.J. Unwin, “GIS, Spatial Analysis and Spatial Statistics”, 20 Progress in 
Human  Geography  (1996), 540-551).  Geographical  data  is  often  aggregated  to  “higher”  units  such  as 
districts in order to present the results of a study in a more useful context. These units are often arbitrary in JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    11 
 
individual  level  data  on  these  independent  variables  is  needed  here.  One  study  that 
follows  this  approach  is  Humphreys  and  Weinstein,  who  look  for  determinants  of 
recruitment patterns and the organizational capacity of rebel groups in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia,  by  using  individual  level  survey  data  of  ex-combatant.
29  Interestingly, 
recruitment there often had no economic logic at all, but followed lines of coercion, 
group pressure, ideology and the like.  
 
However, there are further problems with the „first generation‟ of systematic civil war 
research. Sambanis argues that this type of quantitative literature has produced a number 
of  spurious  correlations  at  the  macro-level  and  several  non-replicable  results.
30 The 
interpretation of exactly the same explanato ry proxies used in the CH and FL  models 
remains unclear.
31 Robust empirical findings across  different model specifications are 
also rare. A sensitivity analysis carried out by Hegre and Sambanis has systematically 
explored how sensitive 93 variables used in the literature are to variation in the set of 
control variables, definitions of civil war, model specification or data sets used.
32 Only 
the variables average income per capita (lower levels increase the risk of conflict onset) 
and population size (larger populations increase the risk of conflict) turned out to be 
robust. Table 1 below gives an  overview of the standard variables that turned out to be 
significant in the FL and CH models, together with the signs of their coefficients. Income 
and population size are shown in bold to indicate that only these two variables turned out 
to be robust against different model specifications. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
nature and different areal units can be just as meaningful in displaying the same information – they are 
“modifiable”. 
29 M. Humphreys and J. Weinstein, “Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War”, 100 American 
Political Science Review (2006), 429-447. 
30 N. Sambanis, “Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War”, above note 5. 
31 The exact interpretation of the variable “GDP per capita” varies from a proxy measure for state strength 
(FL) to a proxy for income or poverty (CH). 
32 H. Hegre and N. Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis of the Empirical Literature on Civil War Onset”, 50 
Journal of Conflict Resolution (2006), 508-535. 
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Table 1: Explanatory variables used in CH and FL models and signs of the respective 
correlation coefficients. 
 
 
Explanatory Variables, CH & FL Models 
 
Relationship to Civil War Onset 
Income (poverty or state strength)  - 
Population size  + 
Prior war/peace duration  - 
Economic growth  - 
Natural resource dependence  + 
Ethnic dominance  + 
Political freedom  - 
Other: Political Instability; New State; 
Terrain; Population Dispersion; Diasporas 
mixed 
+/-: positive/negative relationship to civil war onset 
 
 
But if only income level and population size really matter, we cannot explain why we 
observe a civil war in the first place but no other forms of mass level violence – where 
income matters to some degree, too.  
 
Missing data is another problem, especially when we treat the occurrence of civil wars as 
a rare event over the whole period under study. This implies that single conflicts can have 
a huge impact on the statistical regression results, once they are included or excluded 
from  the  analysis.  To  give  an  example,  the  Bosnian  civil  war  from  1992-1995  was 
included in neither the CH nor the FL model, because of a lack of income data. Kalyvas 
and Sambanis report that by filling in that missing data for Bosnia, the income coefficient JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    13 
 
drops  by  13%  in  the  CH  model.  This  makes  the  Bosnian  case  a  very  influential 
observation with a high leverage effect on the slope of the estimated regression line.
33 
 
Further on, case studies show that there is a severe mismatch between macro -level 
indicators  and  proposed  micro -level  mechanisms  of  conflict  participation.
34  Often, 
detailed case narratives guided by the theoretical framework of the CH model tell very 
different stories about causal mechanisms  „on the ground‟ in different sets of country 
cases.
35 The macro-level correlation between lootable resources and the occurrence of 
civil war  in particular  has received attention, and is compatible with at least six rival 
families of very different causal mechanisms that  could explain the relationship, rebel 
greed being just one of them.
36 
 
These non-findings cast serious doubts about the validity of inferences drawn from 
conventional econometric studies of civil war, once h ighly aggregated data and cross -
country data sets are used. As Kalyvas has put it, it is overly optimistic to hope that we 
could  ever  explain  or  predict  how  or  when  civil  wars  will  start  from  a  macro -
perspective.
37 In  a  similar vein,  Atlas and  Licklider  point  out  that   “the  interesting 
theoretical question about civil war in general is not why it begins (the possible reasons 
are surely too many to enumerate) or why it stops (all sorts of contingent explanations 
                                                 
33 S.N. Kalyvas and N. Sambanis, “Bosnia‟s Civil War: Origins and Violence Dynamics”, in P. Collier and 
N.  Sambanis  (eds),  Understanding  Civil  War:  Evidence  and  Analysis.  Volume  II  (The  World  Bank, 
Washington, DC, 2005), 191-122.  
34 P. Collier and N. Sambanis (eds.), Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis  (The World Bank: 
Washington, DC, 2005);  N. Sambanis, “Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War”, 
above note 5. 
35 P. Collier and N. Sambanis, Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, above note 34.  
36 M. Humphreys, “Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms”, 49 
Journal of Conflict Resolution (2005), 508-537; M. Ross, “A Closer Look at Oil, Diamonds, and Civil 
War”, 9 Annual Review of Political Science (2006), 265-300; M. Ross,  “How Does  Natural Resource 
Wealth Influence Civil War?”, 58 International Organization (2004a), 35-67; M. Ross, “What Do We 
Know About Natural Resources and Civil War”, 43 Journal of Peace Research (2004b), 337-356. 
37 S.N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2006). JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    14 
 
from simple fatigue to outside force may apply) but why it so often does not resume 
when it might”.
38 
 
 
III. DISAGGREGATING THE STUDY OF CIVIL WAR AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 
 
Recently,  a  „second  generation‟  of  quantitative  literature  concerned  with  more  finely 
tuned measures of the correlates of civil war has established itself, which is primarily the 
result of an increasing dissatisfaction with research on civil war aggregated at the cross-
national level.  
 
To further evaluate popular explanations for the onset of for civil war such as poverty, 
inequality, rough terrain or ethnic composition of a country, researchers are now adopting 
disaggregated research designs, e.g. with the help of Geographic Information Software 
(GIS).
39 Almost by definition, civil war is a sub-state phenomenon driven by an amalgam 
of local, national and transnational processes. Geographical  differences in key variables 
such as natural resources cannot be covered by crude proxie s and country-level data. 
Countries are  seldom geographically uniform, and the areas where conflict occurs are 
rarely typical or representative for the whole country. Take the example of lootable 
resources and conflict onset or duration. If wars ostensibly due to resource abundance 
occur in the resource -poor part of the country, we face a s purious correlation at the 
macro-level of analysis. Thus, geographically disaggregated analysis allows us  to test 
spatial correlation between smaller conflict events within countries and the location of 
resources e.g. conflict diamonds. 
                                                 
38 P.M.  Atlas  and  R.  Licklider,  “Conflict  among  Former  Allies  After  Civil  War  Settlement:  Sudan, 
Zimbabwe, Chad, and Lebanon”, 36 Journal of Peace Research (1999), 35-54, at 35. 
39 GIS is a coherent software system that can be used to manage,   represent, transform and analys e 
qualitative as well as quantitative data. This data is geo -referenced: it includes spatial or positional 
information, such as, e.g. longitude or latitude coordinates. GIS offers the researcher the possibility to 
manipulate and easily visualize certain or all aspects of that geo -referenced data – most commonly in the 
form of a geographic map as visual output. In addition, statistical output can be analysed inside the GIS or 
exported to other standard statistical software packages. JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    15 
 
 
Researchers have created geographic or spatially disaggregated data sets to examine the 
impact of different factors on civil war locally. For example, Buhaug and Gates
40 and 
Raleigh and Hegre
41 provide information about the precise location of conflicts, whereas 
Gilmore, Lujala, Gleditsch, and Rød
42 focus on the location of  diamonds and gemstones, 
Lujala, Rød and Thieme
43 on the location of petroleum fields and Weidmann, Rød and 
Cederman
44 on geographic settlement patterns of ethnic groups. In the following section, 
I will give a more detailed overview of these new data sets. 
 
 
A.  Disaggregated Data on the Geographic Location of Conflict Events 
 
Using data for the location of conflict centres and their radius, Buhaug and Gates
45 and 
Buhaug and Lujala
46 show that conflicts tend to be longer the further they are fro m the 
capital. Buhaug and Gates
47 construct a relative location indicator by using  GIS to 
measure that distance. Raleigh and Hegre have introduced an armed conflict location and 
events data set ACLED.
48 The ACLED data set – which is a spatial refinement of the 
                                                 
40 H. Buhaug and S. Gates, “The Geography of Civil War”, 39 Journal of Peace Research (2002), 417-433.  
41 C. Raleigh and H. Hegre, “Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset”. Paper 
presented  to  the  conference  on  „Disaggregating  the  Study  of  Civil  War  and  Transnational  Violence‟, 
University of California Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation, San Diego, CA, 7–8 March 2005. 
42 E. Gilmore, P. Lujala, N.P. Gleditsch and J.K. R ød, “Conflict Diamonds: A New Dataset”, 22 Conflict 
Management and Peace Science (2005), 257–272. 
43 P.  Lujala,  J.K.  Rod  and  N.  Thieme,  “Fighting  over  Oil:  Introducing  a  New  Dataset”,  24  Conflict 
Management and Peace Science (2007), 239–256. 
44 N.B. Weidmann, J.K. Rød and L.-E. Cederman, “Representing Ethnic Groups in Space: A New Dataset”, 
Journal of Peace Research (2010), forthcoming. 
45 Buhaug and Gates, “The Geography of Civil War”, above note 40.  
46 H. Buhaug and P. Lujala, “Accounting for Scale: Measuring Geography in Quantitative Studies of Civil 
War”, 24 Political Geography (2005), 399–418. 
47 Buhaug and Gates, “The Geography of Civil War”, above note 40. 
48 Raleigh and Hegre, “Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset”, above note 
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established Uppsala/PRIO conflict data set – lists reported confrontations between the 
fighting parties in a civil war, along with the date and the spatial coordinates of the event. 
ACLED codes the exact location and specific information on individual battle events, the 
transfer of military control from the government to the rebel groups and vice versa and 
the location of rebel group strongholds, among other information. In the current version, 
it covers mainly conflict countries in Western and Central Africa from 1960 through 
2004. 
 
In  a  pilot  study  using  these  data,  Hegre  and  Raleigh  focus  on  the  links  between 
population size, location, concentration and civil war onset, covering Central Africa.
49 
The  conflict  event  data  are  correlated  with  geographically  disaggregated  data  on 
populations, distance to capitals, borders, and road netwo rks. The authors conclude that 
their study should be enriched by future research regarding the location of lootable 
resources and the spatial distribution of ethnic groups.  
 
Buhaug and Rød have constructed a civil conflict data set in GIS format, consisti ng of 
conflict polygons.
50 It contains precise information on conflict zones. The geographic 
scope of a conflict is operationalized as the smallest possible circle that encompasses all 
reported  locations  of  battle  events  and  all  known  rebel -held  areas.  Coun tries  are 
disaggregated into smaller grid cells via GIS. For each grid cell, GIS is used to identify 
whether or not the cell represents a location affected by conflict. A grid structure of three 
different resolutions is proposed. For a study on African civ il war between 1970 and 
2001, Buhaug and Rød found no support for the rough terrain proposition using local 
measures.  In  addition,  the  Peacekeeping  Operations  Locations  and  Event  Data  Set 
                                                 
49  H.  Hegre  and  C.  Raleigh,  “Population  Size,  Concentration  and  Civil  War:  A  Geographically 
Disaggregated Analysis”. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, 
San Diego, 22-25 March 2006. 
50 H.  Buhaug  and  J.K.  Rød,  “Local  Determinants  of  African  Civil  Wars,  1970-2001”,  25  Political 
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PKOLED
51 provide  geographically disaggregated data  on  interventions in civil war. 
However, it has not been officially released yet. 
 
 
B.  Disaggregated Data on the Location of Natural Resources  
 
PETRODATA includes the locations of hydrocarbons (oil, gas and condensates) for the 
entire globe, covering the period between 1946 and 2003.
52 Both onshore and offshore 
fields are listed, along with the type of reserve. DIADATA comprises a global list of 
diamond  deposits,  distinguishing  between  primary  and  secondary  diamonds.
53 Like 
PETRODATA, the data set also lists the year of discovery and the first year of production, 
if available. For all other kinds of gemstones, a separate data set is available. 
 
 
C.  Disaggregated Data on Settlement Patterns of Ethnic Groups  
 
Toft stresses the problem of geographically concentrated ethnic groups in peripheries and 
their potential to mobilize against the centre.
54 The Geo-Referencing of Ethnic Groups 
(GREG) data set is a global ethnic map.
55 It maps settlement patterns of ethnic groups 
worldwide, based on a Soviet Atlas from the 1960s, which is problematic in terms of 
changing ethnic boundaries. GREG data has been used in Buhaug, Cederman, and Rød to 
                                                 
51 H. Dorussen, “Introducing PKOLED: A Peacekeeping Operations Location and Event Dataset”. Paper 
prepared  for  the  Conference  on  Disaggregating  the  Study  of  Civil  War  and  Transnational  Violence, 
University of Essex, UK, November 24–25, 2007. 
52 P. Lujala et al, “Fighting over Oil: Introducing a New Dataset”, above note 43. 
53 E. Gilmore et al, “Conflict Diamonds: A New Dataset”, above note 42. 
54 M.D. Toft,  The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2003). 
55 N.B. Weidmann et al, “Representing Ethnic Groups in Space: A New Dataset”, above note 44. JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    18 
 
compute population estimates for ethnic groups, the distance of groups from the capital, 
and for an indicator of the roughness of terrain where a group settles.
56 
 
 
D.  Disaggregated Economic Output Data 
 
Nordhaus has developed a geographically based data set on local economic activity.
57 
This is called the G-Econ project which stands for geographically based economic data. 
G-Econ provides gross output at a 1-degree longitude by 1-degree latitude resolution at a 
global scale for all terrestrial cells. The  resolution is approximately 100km by 100 km 
which roughly equals the size of most third-level administrative units (e.g. counties in the 
US), producing „gridded‟ output data or gross cell product, GCP on value added for 1990. 
The basic measure of output is gross value added in a specific geographical region. This 
is conceptually similar to gross domestic product on a national level. In the next sub-
section below, I will deal with theoretical disaggregation in the sense of different actor 
constellations during the process of civil war, as well as distinct conflict types that are 
normally pooled under one data set.  
 
 
E.  Theoretical Disaggregation: Different Actor Constellations in Ethnic Civil Wars 
 
Disaggregation can be undertaken in a number of ways. Above, geographic or spatial 
disaggregation of key variables that figure prominently as factors related to the onset of 
civil war were addressed. Further disaggregation should focus more on agency and the 
actors involved in civil wars themselves, as well as on different types of civil wars. Take 
the following example: instead of measuring ethnicity with state-level population shares, 
                                                 
56 H. Buhaug, L.-E. Cederman and J. K. Rød, “Disaggregating Ethno-Nationalist Civil Wars: A Dyadic 
Test of Exclusion Theory”, 62 International Organization (2008), 531-551. 
57 W.D. Nordhaus, “Geography and Macroeconomics: New Data and New Findings”, 103 Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences (2006), 3510-3517. JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    19 
 
Cederman,  Girardin,  and  Wimmer
58 and Buhaug,  Cederman and Rød
59 focus on  the 
relationship between ethnicity and conflict by identifying the ethnic groups involved and 
their dyadic political power relations. Assuming that a state consists of a numbe r of 
different ethnic groups, a basic centre-periphery logic is introduced, in line with the FL 
model of insurgency. Cederman and Girardin map a governmental ethnic group  – or a 
coalition  –  at  the  centre  (usually  the  capital),  the  so-called  „ethnic  group  in  power‟, 
against excluded peripheral groups.
60 The marginalized ethnic groups at the periphery can 
be interpreted as challengers to the status quo and to state sovereignty in general. That 
way, ethnic conflicts are seen as nationalistic power struggles unfolding a round the 
ultimate question of „who owns the state‟. Conflict becomes more likely when excluded 
groups are larger in demographic size and are located in spatially peripheral areas. 
 
However, the idea that  one ethnic  group  at  a time fights  the  government  in  a  given 
country-year could be unrealistic. Therefore, one has to find out in how many instances 
more than one ethnic group is involved in the actual fighting against the government in 
the same time period. In order to do so, I rely on the data set compiled by Buhaug et al., 
which is limited to Eurasia and Northern Africa for the time period 1946-2003.
61 This 
data  is  a  dyadic  extension  of  the  well  established  Uppsala/PRIO  Armed  Conflict 
Dataset
62, based on ethnic conflicts only.  The dyadic data set uses geo-coded centre-
periphery dyads of ethnic groups, which for example allows for the measure of the power 
balance between these pairs, data on ethnic groups  access to power, on the location of 
                                                 
58 L.-E. Cederman, L. Girardin and A. Wimmer, “Getting Ethnicity Right: An Expert Survey on Power 
Distributions among Ethnic Groups”. Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, 2006. 
59 H. Buhaug, L.-E. Cederman and J. K. Rød, “Disaggregating Ethno-Nationalist Civil Wars”, above note 
56. 
60 L.-E. Cederman and L. Girardin, “Beyond Fractionalization”, above note 13. 
61 H. Buhaug, L.-E. Cederman and J. K. Rød, “Disaggregating Ethno-Nationalist Civil Wars”, above note 
56. Missing conflicts (both ethnic and non-ethnic) are: Angola, Burundi, Chad, Colombia, Congo DR, 
Dominican  Rep,  El  Salvador,  Ethiopia,  Guatemala,  Guinea-Bissau,  Liberia,  Mozambique,  Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Peru, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Zaire, Zimbabwe 
62 N.P. Gleditsch et al, “Armed Conflict 1946-2001”, above note 5. JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    20 
 
ethnic groups and on distances and terrain. The selection criteria for the cases were as 
follows: first, an onset between centre and periphery in any given year since 1946 must 
be present. In addition, only cases in which the centre is challenged by more than one 
ethnic group in the same year were reported. Then, I compared the number of onsets and 
incidences  where only  one group challenges  the centre with  the number for multiple 
challengers in the same year. Table 2 below shows the result of this. 
 
Table 2: Original data set versus data set with multiple onsets and incidents of ethnic war 
 
  # of conflict onsets  # of conflict incidences 
Original data (Buhaug et al. 2008)  118  889 
More than 1 group fights in the same 
year  
71  
(61%) 
595  
(67%) 
 
 
The table shows that in 61% of all onsets of ethnic conflict, more than one ethnic group is 
involved in the actual fighting against the government.  If incidents (country  years in 
which the conflict was active) of ethnic civil wars are taken instead of onset, in more than 
two thirds of all cases more than one group is involved in armed civil strife at the same 
time. Next, based on the reduced data with multiple groups in conflict in the same year, 
Table 3 presents the relevant countries and ethnic groups.  
 
Table 3: Countries and number of ethnic groups in conflict 
 
Country and year 
of conflict onset 
Number of 
ethnic groups 
in conflict in 
first year 
Overall 
number of 
ethnic groups 
in country  
Ethnic group name 
Georgia 1992  2  16  Abkhaz, Ossetes 
India 1982  2  60  Manipuris, Tippera 
Iran 1946  2  27  Azerbaijanians, Kurds JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    21 
 
Iran 1966  2  27  Azerbaijanians, Kurds 
Moldova 1992  2  6  Russians, Ukrainians 
Myanmar 1948  2  20  Mon (Talaing), Karen 
Myanmar 1949  2  20  Mon (Talaing), Karen 
Myanmar 1961  3  20  Shan, Mon (Talaing), Kachins 
Myanmar 1995  2  20  Karen, Kachis 
Myanmar 1996  2  20  Karen, Mon (Talaing) 
USSR 1990  2  110  Armenians, Azerbaijanians 
Yugoslavia 1991  2  16  Croats, Slovenes 
Iran 1993  3  27  Azerbaijanians, Iran Arabs, Kurds 
Iran 1996  3  27  Azerbaijanians, Iran Arabs, Kurds 
Russia 1999  3  83  Avars, Chechens, Kumuk 
Afghanistan 1989  4  22  Hazara-Berberi, Hazara-Deh-i-
Zainat, Tajiks, Uzbeks 
USSR 1946  4  110  Estonians, Letts, Lithuanians, 
Ukrainians 
Indonesia 1950  3  97  Amboinese, Buru, Seran Islanders 
Indonesia 1975  5  97  Dagada, Macassai, Mambai, Tetum, 
Tokode 
Indonesia 1992  6  97  Achinese, Dagada, Macassai, 
Mambai, Tetum, Tokode 
Indonesia 1997  6  97  Achinese, Dagada, Macassai, 
Mambai, Tetum, Tokode 
Philippines 1970 
 
10-13  35  Bagobo, Bilaan, Lanao, 
Magindanao, Mandaya, Subanon, 
Sulu-Samal, Tagakoolo, Tagbanuwa 
and Palawan, Tirurai/Dulangan/ 
Tagabili 
Philippines 1993 
 
10-13  35  Bagobo, Bilaan, Lanao, 
Magindanao, Mandaya, Subanon, JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    22 
 
Sulu-Samal, Tagakoolo, Tagbanuwa 
and Palawan, Tirurai/Dulangan/ 
Tagabili 
The table indicates that much more research is needed on the question of whether more 
than one ethnic civil war can go on within a country at the same time, when different 
ethnic groups fight the same government simultaneously (probably via formal or informal 
military alliances), especially in cases such as Afghanistan, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
 
 
F.  Theoretical Disaggregation: Different Types of Civil War 
 
40% of the world‟s independent states have more than five sizable ethnic populations, 
one or more of which faces serious economic, political and social discrimination.
63 As 
mentioned above, Sambanis reports that two third of all civil conflicts  can be considered 
ethnic conflicts.
64 Most of these take the form of secessions or are fought  over territorial 
autonomy.  
 
Fearon codes five different classes of civil wars.
65 He finds that separatist wars usually 
last longer than other forms of rebellion li ke coups, revolutions or anti -colonial wars. 
This is so because secessionist conflicts tend to appear far away from the capital, as 
illustrated for example by  the conflict in Indonesia over the province of Aceh. Case 
studies suggest that unequal distribution of income and resources at the sub-national level 
contribute to secessionist civil war especially.
66 Thus, for further disaggregated research 
on different types of civil conflicts , one could hypothesize that the importance of sel f-
determination and sovereignty for a group should imply a different mapping of micro-
level  cleavages  onto  macro-level  cleavages  than  in  other  types  of  civil  war  that  are 
primarily about individual or private motives. 
                                                 
63 T. Gurr, Peoples Versus States, above note 12; Gurr, Minorities at Risk, above note 12. 
64 N. Sambanis, “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?”, above note 7. 
65 J. Fearon, “Why do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?”, above note 17. 
66 E.g., P. Collier and  N. Sambanis, Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, above note 34. JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    23 
 
 
 Figure 1 below gives a suggestion for how civil conflicts can be further theoretically 
disaggregated,  according  to  the  commonly  applied  dimensions  of  ethnic  versus  non-
ethnic civil wars and conflicts over territory versus conflicts over governance or state 
power.
67 
 
 
Figure 1: Typology of civil wars according to role of ethnicity and incompatibilities 
 
                          
                               
    conflict over territory                    conflict over governance     
             
 
       
                    ethnic conflict     “self-determination”      “state ownership” 
              (language, religion)        (secession, territorial autonomy)            (ethnic group in power) 
                  
                            
       
 
            non-ethnic conflict           “opportunity”            “coup d‟état” 
  (economic or private motives)      (new wars, resource wars)                    (military overthrow) 
                              
 
 
   
 
Consider  the  following  examples  for  each  cell  of  the  matrix. Between Albanians  and 
Serbs, at least since 1997, the Kosovar Albanian struggle for self-determination and thus 
greater  territorial  autonomy  for  Kosovo  turned  violent.  Wars  of  self-determination 
                                                 
67 The two incompatibilities mentioned here, territory or governance, are based upon the coding logic of the 
Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (N.P. Gleditsch et al, “Armed Conflict 1946-2001”, above note 5). 
The coding reflects the two most basic and mutually exclusive grievance structures that may exist in or 
between  countries,  and  that  often  play  key  roles  for  conflict  resolution.  An  intrastate  conflict  over 
governance (or „government‟ as in the original coding) is about control of the whole state (who should 
control it and how), whereas a conflict over territory is about control of part of the same state. There can 
only be one incompatibility over governance in a given year, but there can be several territorial conflicts at 
the same time. JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    24 
 
include  those  in  the  secessionist  province  of  Aceh  in  Indonesia,  Sri  Lanka,  southern 
Sudan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Their protagonists claim the right to their own nation-
state or demand unification with their ethnic kin across state borders. These types of wars 
are among the most deadly and protracted of all conflict types.  
 
Rebellions  or  insurgencies  against  a  government  by  internal  forces  of  distinct  ethnic 
groups form the second type, an ethnic conflict over the control of state power. Current 
fighting in Iraq between Sunni and Shiite Muslims after the end of Saddam Hussein‟s 
exclusionary Sunni-led minority rule serves as prime example.  
 
Conflicts that have no clear ethnic dimension and that are fought primarily for economic 
or private motives are, for example, the Columbian drug war that started in 1964 or the 
war in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2002, as well as the war in Liberia over control of 
the diamond industry and lootable resources, and many more conflicts in west, central 
and the Horn of Africa.  
 
Military coups or overthrows form the last type. They are on average much shorter and 
produce fewer victims than other civil war types, and often appear together with class-
based popular revolutions.
68 Coups related to class cleavages that lasted for under a year 
took place  in Argentina in 1955, Costa Rica  in 1948, Bolivia in 1952, the Dominican 
Republic in 1965, Paraguay in 1947 and Cuba in 1958. There are similar cases outside 
Latin/South America, e.g. Iraq 1959, Yemen Arab Republic 1948 and Iran 1978. 
 
If we focus on secessionist conflicts as the most common type, then the question of what 
factors cause a sub-national region to want to fight a war becomes relevant. Variables 
previously  identified  at  the  national  macro-level  then  work  differently,  as  it  seems 
plausible to assume that, for example, in the case of income or poverty, richer regions 
might  want  to  secede  more.  Inter-regional  inequality  and  ethnic  homogeneity  of  the 
region, not just ethnic fractionalization or polarization of the country as a whole, might 
support secessionism, as well as territorial concentration of natural resources and their 
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significance for the national economy. A sub-national region‟s demand for sovereignty 
should increase with its geographic distance from the centre, and a history of regional 
autonomy  or  previous  conflict  with  the  centre.  Ethnic  violence  then  would  be  the 
response to indiscriminate state repression such as taking away minority group rights, 
because  repression  makes  non-violence  costlier  and  can  generate  ethnic  fear  and 
resentment. 
 
It  may  be  plausible  to  assume  that  insurgencies  that  start  with  separatist  aims  may 
become more ambitious over time, especially if the central government is very weak, and 
seek to take over the state if they face realistic prospects of doing so, or when earlier 
attempts at secession failed or were suppressed by the centre. Ethiopia and Zaire might fit 
this  story,  but  more  empirical  evidence  is  needed  here.  The  opposite  seems  equally 
plausible:  most  recent  wars  of  self-determination  started  with  demands  for  complete 
independence,  but  ended  up  with  the  negotiated  or  de  facto  autonomy  status  of  the 
respective  ethnic  group  within  existing  state  borders  (East  Timor  and  Chechnya  are 
exceptions here). 
 
Irredentist  conflicts,  as  often  mentioned  in  the  literature,  are  secessions  „in  reverse‟. 
Irredentism is any position advocating annexation of territories administered by another 
state on the grounds of common ethnicity or prior historical possession, actual or alleged. 
It is the attempt by an ethnic group or country to include geographic regions of „ethnic 
kin‟ outside its country borders to its main territory, and would lead to an interstate war.
69 
A nationalizing state, a national movement representing  an ethnic minority within that 
state, and an external national homeland, to which that minority is construed as ethnically 
belonging is needed for a situation of irredentism. The civil war  in the Balkans, where 
one third of the Serbs were settling outside the Serbian „homeland‟ but were mobilized by 
a nationalizing government to rejoin, is an example of this conflict triggering mechanism. 
Serbs in Bosnia went from being part of Yugoslavia‟s dominant community to members 
of a minority when the federal state collapsed. As such, they eagerly supported efforts by 
Belgrade to reclaim much of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
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To sum up, there are different possibilities for how the study of civil war can be enriched 
by the logic of disaggregation. Below, I illustrate this logic further with the case study of 
the Bosnian civil war 1992-1995.  
 
 
IV. A DISAGGREGATED PERSPECTIVE ON THE BOSNIAN CIVIL WAR 1992-1995 
 
Current theories of civil war onset, duration and termination can hardly tell us what type 
of violence will occurs, how intense that violence will be, who will be most affected by it, 
whether a conflict will escalate over time, which locations of a country will be most 
affected  by  fighting,  and  who  the  key  actors  involved  will  be.  All  these  factors  are 
important when it comes to actual policy advice on how to deal best with civil wars and 
ethnic  conflict.  Nevertheless,  until  very  recently,  warfare  during  civil  war  and  its 
potential for temporal, geographic and actor-specific variation was not considered to be 
of much interest to the academic community. The wars of Yugoslav dissolution, and the 
conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina from April 1992 to December 1995 in particular, 
dominated world headlines at the time and generated hundreds of publications on various 
aspects of the war, concerning subjects ranging from the roots causes of the conflict to 
analyses of international involvement and post-Dayton reconstruction policy. 
 
The Bosnia conflict of 1992-1995 is a prime example of how the local-level dynamics of 
violence unfold over a certain territory and over time.
70 The war in Bosnia in 1992 was a 
spill over from earlier developments in 1991 in Croatia‟s Krajina region, where the local 
Serb minority declared its independence from Croatia, following the previous examples 
of  Slovenia  and  Croatia.  In  August  1991,  localized  war  broke  out  between  Croatian 
militias and police forces, local Serb militias and parts of the Jugoslav National Army, 
which  later  collapsed.  UN  peacekeepers  were  deployed  and  UN  protected  areas 
established. Most of that early fighting was characterized by very local-level, house to 
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house warfare
71 and rapid ethnic polarization between Serbs and Croats in the mixed 
communities of Krajina and Slavonia.
72 There were essentially two wars in Bosnia. The 
first was the war of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats against the well-armed and 
well-organized Bosnian Serbs (and Serb irregulars), as the Bosni an Serbs sought to 
establish a „Serb Republic‟, to exist either as an independent state or to create a „greater 
Serbia‟. The second was the war between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims 
from 1992-1994 in Central Bosnia and Herzegovina, as Croat forces sought to create an 
independent Croat Herceg-Bosna or annex „Croat‟ areas of Bosnia to Croatia. Kalyvas 
and Sambanis point out that, so far, our understanding of patterns of violence regarding 
the Bosnian civil war remains anecdotic, partisan or biased.
73 
 
 
A.  Different Fighting Parties and Shifting Alliances 
 
As soon as Bosnia declared its independence, the war fully diffused into Bosnia. As 
Sambanis and Kalyvas note, the presence of the JNA in each region was crucial.
74 It 
should have deterred conflict escalation, but the fact that it was Serb -dominated meant 
that it was used by Bosnian Serbs and Croatian Serbs in their conflict against the regional 
government. According to most authors, there were no clear armies or internally coherent 
ethnic groups fighting during the Bosnian civil war. The official armies were a mix of 
irregular forces, self-help local militias, home guards, police forces, regular forces, parts 
of the former JNA, foreign mercenaries and criminal or quasi-criminal elements.
75 Up to 
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18  different  groups  were  fighting  each  other  at  the  same  time,  with  various  shifting 
alliances between them. Many of these groups started out as small in number and became 
more organized and cohesive only later in the war. Mobilization of fighters was mainly 
organized locally by local strongman along ethnic lines. Although the Serbs in Bosnia 
were a dispersed minority in terms of population share, they were militarily strong at the 
beginning of the conflict. The war ended in a balance of power between Bosnian Serbs 
and Bosnian Croats, mainly because the Croats were supported by the US. There were 
several shifting military alliances among Serbs, Croats and Muslims in between. 
 
 
B.  Different Locations and Victims of the Conflict  
 
Within Bosnia, Croats, Serbs and Bosnian Muslims were widely dispersed geographically, 
with several small areas of locally concentrated majorities. Another important dimension 
is the divide along rural and urban areas in Bosnia. A pattern of violence between the 
less-developed and less-educated rural areas (mostly Serb-dominated) against the more 
affluent  urban  areas  (Muslim-dominated)  has  been  reported.
76 Sambanis and Kalyvas 
point out that violence in Bosnia varied wildly across geographic space.
77 Most regions of 
Bosnia remained untouched by the fighting. Violence tended to occur in areas that were 
of economic or strategic (in terms of connecting conquered territories) importance. Prison 
camps were often located close to local power centres. Based on secondary sources such 
as Human Rights Watch and the US Department of State reports, Kalyvas and Sambanis 
mention that ethnic cleansing and violence against civil ians was most frequent in the 
north-western and north-eastern areas of Bosnia, present to lower degrees in central areas, 
and almost absent in the south.
78 
 
Figure 2 below shows a breakdown of the different larger regions within Bosnia and the 
numbers of civilian and military victims in these regions, which vary considerably.  Note 
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that the overall number of victims is much lower than previous figures suggested (around 
100,000 compared to 250,000-300,000), and that civilians are not the main victims of the 
conflict,  as  often  reported,  but  soldiers  (except  only  for  one  of  the  seven  regions, 
Podrinje) belonging to a military unit, roughly in an overall ratio of 2:3.
79    
 
 
Figure 2.  Absolute numbers of killed civilians and soldiers in Bosnia, by region  
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The Bosnian conflict has seen some of the most severe forms of ethnic cleaning and 
targeted mass killings of modern times, primarily conducted in the major cities. However, 
the „normal‟ war between clashing armies or „regular‟ military units was mainly fought in 
the  countryside  or  rural  areas.  Kalyvas
80 has characterized the Bosnian civil war as 
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80 S.N. Kalyvas, “Warfare in Civil Wars”, in I. Duyvesteyn and J. Angstrom (eds.), Rethinking the Nature 
of War (Frank Cass: Abingdton, 2005): 88-108. JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    30 
 
„symmetric non-conventional‟ – as compared to irregular
81 and conventional
82 ones – 
containing a mix of regular and irregular forces of equal strength fighting over territorial 
control. These conflicts are defined by stalemated frontlines of the „regular‟ war and take 
place in a political context shaped by state collapse. Troops are mainly mobilized locally 
by local strongmen, often developing into paramilitary groups or self-defence militias on 
all warring sides. This type of civil war tends to be especially violent. Evidence for this 
can be found in the tactic of ethnic cleansing and mass deportations of civilians along 
ethnic lines. This tactic was initiated in Croatia in summer 1991 and by the Serbs in early 
1992 in Bosnia, but became common practice by all sides in the war later on, while 
varying in its degree. It is often mentioned that paramilitary organizations are responsible 
for most of this  type of violence, but  clear  empirical  evidence is  lacking.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests a situation of rapid ethnification of violence once the war had begun.
83 
When put this way, ethnicity or ethnic polarization was not a key factor in the outbreak of 
the conflict, but rather the result of violence during the conflict.  
 
Elsewhere, Kalyvas stresses the strategic use of different types of violence in order to 
shape the behaviour of the civilian population during the Greek civil war.
84 Other 
scholars have asked why civilians and non-combatants are the primary targets during 
fighting
85, or if one-sided violence against civilians is a function of the military balance 
between rebels and the government
86. Recent counterinsurgency case studies do provide a 
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micro-perspective, but focus exclusively on insurgent violence, downplaying the role of 
the government.
87 
 
The ACLED coverage of the Balkan wars has not been released officially; the pre-release 
for Bosnia that was made available to me contains 540 overall conflict events. 147 out of 
the 540 events (or 27%) are coded as one -sided violence (or ethnic cleansing against 
civilians). From the 147 events coded as one -sided, 30 (or 20%) are non-deadly events. 
Using GIS software, I counted the overall number of violent conflict events per Bosnian 
municipality. This number ranges from 0 to 60, with a mean of about 5. Figure 3 below 
shows ACLED Balkan events b y type of violence (civilian versus   military) and by 
municipality. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. ACLED data for Bosnia, by type and municipality. 
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In Figure 3, the red dots represent the location of one-sided violent events over the whole 
conflict  period.  Black  dots  represent  the  „normal‟  military  conflict  that  was  ongoing 
during the conflict period.  Dots can include more than one event, and the size of the dots 
does not represent the severity of the event in terms of related deaths.  
 
 
C.  Different Phases and Intensity of the Conflict 
 
In terms of temporal variation, most of the violence (both one-sided and military) is 
concentrated in the first months of the war and to a lesser degree towards the end of the 
conflict, with several smaller peaks or outbursts of violence in between. This is in line 
with Kalyvas‟ theory
88, that more violence is likely to occur in phases of the conflict 
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when control over certain territory has not yet been established by the warring factions. 
This is shown in Figure 4 below, again using the ACLED data set for Bosnia. The black 
line represents all conflict events according to month, while the red line indicates one-
sided violence against civilians.  
 
Figure 4. Temporal variation of conflict events for Bosnia, all types. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
I have started this article by stressing that research on civil war and ethnic conflict is 
currently a vibrant area in both political science and economics. A number of important 
insights about the covariates for the onset of civil war have been uncovered empirically 
by looking at country-level characteristics of all civil wars since the end of World War 
Two.  
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However, there is an urgent need for better integration between theories and different 
types of civil war on the one hand, and empirical, data-driven research on the other. Too 
often,  empirical  research  is  inductive  in  nature  and  follows  a  trial  and  error  search 
process for significance. The purpose of this article was to demonstrate that efforts are 
underway to create new data sets and theories of civil war that allow us to look inside the 
„black box‟ of the state and to take micro-level mechanisms of civil war as well as micro-
agency more seriously. A local perspective on civil wars starts to establish itself, and 
scholars now pay increasing attention to within-country variation of key variables such as 
horizontal inequality
89, local GDP and the location of lootable resources. This new line of 
research has to be combined even more with the dynamic relationship between peripheral 
ethnic groups and the state. The question of how civil wars are actually fought on a local 
level, and what kind of violence dynamics arise, is next on the agenda.  
 
While the call for disaggregation is certainly warranted, it is i mportant to keep in mind 
that while dynamics and mechanisms in civil wars are not confined to the macro -level, 
neither are they concentrated solely at the micro-level. On the contrary; identifying the 
set of macro-level and micro-level rationales of action is important, but it is equally 
important to focus on the set of interactions between the macro and the micro level as a 
way to bridge existing scholarship on civil wars. Some questions p ertaining to civil war 
still call for macro-level analysis while others can be  best answered at the micro-level. 
Methodologically, it comes as a surprise that no empirical study exists that uses the 
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technique  of  multilevel/hierarchical  regression  models
90  that  can  dea l  with  such 
interdependencies at various levels of analysis and is well established in sociology, for 
example. 
 
The overwhelming body of theoretical work on civil wars has focused on onset, duration 
or termination of civil wars. Only recent works have tried to provide general theories on 
civil war processes such as recruitment patterns of combatants, violence against civilians, 
and demobilization of former rebels  or the use of child soldiers. In this context,  the 
micro-level approach became relevant; however, this does not mean that a quantitative 
perspective on civil wars has to be abandoned. 
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Appendix 
 
Civil war list used in Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, above 
note 3. 
 
  Country and Region  War 
years  
Case name  
       
  Western Europe      
1  BELGIUM   1956-61   Rwandan revolution  
2  FRANCE   1945-54   Vietnam  
3  FRANCE   1947-48   Madagascar  
4  FRANCE   1952-54   Tunisia  
5  FRANCE   1953-56   Morocco  
6  FRANCE   1954-61   Algeria  
7  FRANCE   1955-60   Cameroon  
8  GREECE   1945-49   DSE  
9  NETHERLANDS   1945-46   IPA  
10  PORTUGAL   1961-75   Angola  
11  PORTUGAL   1962-74   Guinea-Bissau  
12  PORTUGAL   1964-74   Mozambique  
13  UK   1950-56   CPM (Emergency)  
14  UK   1952-56   Mau Mau  
15  UK   1969-99   IRA  
       
  Eastern Europe      
16  AZERBAIJAN   1992-94   Nagorno-Karabagh  JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    37 
 
17  BOSNIA   1992-95   Rep. Srpska/Croats  
18  CROATIA   1992-95   Krajina  
19  GEORGIA   1992-94   Abkhazia  
20  MOLDOVA   1992-92   Dniestr Rep.  
21  RUSSIA   1946-48   Lithuania/BDPS  
22  RUSSIA   1946-50   Ukraine/UPA  
23  RUSSIA   1946-47   Latvia/LTSPA, etc.  
24  RUSSIA   1946-48   Estonia/Forest Brthers  
25  RUSSIA   1994-96   Chechnya  
26  RUSSIA   1999-  Chechnya II  
27  TAJIKISTAN   1992-97   UTO  
28  YUGOSLAVIA   1991-91   Croatia/Krajina  
       
  Asia      
29  AFGHANISTAN   1978-92   Mujahideen  
30  AFGHANISTAN   1992-  v. Taliban  
31  BANGLADESH   1976-97   Chittagong Hills/Shanti Bahini  
32  BURMA   1948-  CPB, Karens, etc.  
33  CAMBODIA   1970-75   FUNK  
34  CAMBODIA   1978-92   Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC, etc  
35  CHINA   1946-50   PLA  
36  CHINA   1950-51   Tibet  
37  CHINA   1956-59   Tibet  
38  CHINA   1991-  Xinjiang  
39  INDIA   1952-  N.East rebels  
40  INDIA   1982-93   Sikhs  
41  INDIA   1989-  Kashmir  
42  INDONESIA   1950-50   Rep. S. Moluccas  
43  INDONESIA   1953-53   Darul Islam  
44  INDONESIA   1958-60   Darul Islam, PRRI, Permesta  JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    38 
 
45  INDONESIA   1965-  OPM (West Papua)  
46  INDONESIA   1975-99   E. Timor  
47  INDONESIA   1991-  GAM (Aceh)  
48  KOREA, S.   1949-50   v. Rhee  
49  LAOS   1960-73   Pathet Lao  
50  NEPAL   1997-  CPN-M/UPF (Maoists)  
51  PAKISTAN   1971-71   Bangladesh  
52  PAKISTAN   1973-77   Baluchistan  
53  PAKISTAN   1993-99   MQM:Sindhis v. Mohajirs  
54  PAPUA N.G.   1988-98   BRA (Bougainville)  
55  PHILIPPINES   1946-52   Huks  
56  PHILIPPINES   1968-  MNLF, MILF  
57  PHILIPPINES   1972-94   NPA  
58  SRI LANKA   1971-71   JVP  
59  SRI LANKA   1983-  LTTE, etc.  
60  SRI LANKA   1987-89   JVP II  
61  VIETNAM, S.   1960-75   NLF  
       
  North Africa/Middle East     
62  ALGERIA   1962-63   Kabylie  
63  ALGERIA   1992-  FIS  
64  CYPRUS   1974-74   Cypriots, Turkey  
65  IRAN   1978-79   Khomeini  
66  IRAN   1979-93   KDPI (Kurds)  
67  IRAQ   1959-59   Shammar  
68  IRAQ   1961-74   KDP, PUK (Kurds)  
69  JORDAN   1970-70   Fedeyeen/Syria v. govt  
70  LEBANON   1958-58   Nasserites v. Chamoun  
71  LEBANON   1975-90   various militias  
72  MOROCCO   1975-88   Polisario  JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    39 
 
73  TURKEY   1977-80   Militarized party politics  
74  TURKEY   1984-99   PKK  
75  YEMEN   1994-94   South Yemen  
76  YEMEN ARAB REP.   1948-48   Opp. coalition  
77  YEMEN ARAB REP.   1962-69   Royalists  
78  YEMEN PEOP. REP.   1986-87   Faction of Socialist Party  
       
  Sub-Saharan Africa      
79  ANGOLA   1975-  UNITA  
80  ANGOLA   1992-  FLEC (Cabinda)  
81  BURUNDI   1972-72   Hutu uprising  
82  BURUNDI   1988-88   Org. massacres on both sides  
83  BURUNDI   1993-  Hutu groups v. govt  
84  CENTRAL AFRICAN REP.   1996-97   Factional fighting  
85  CHAD   1965-  FROLINAT, various ...  
86  CHAD   1994-98   Rebels in South  
87  CONGO   1998-99   Factional fighting  
88  DEM. REP. CONGO   1960-65   Katanga, Kasai, CNL  
89  DEM. REP. CONGO   1977-78   FLNC  
90  DEM. REP. CONGO   1996-97   AFDL (Kabila)  
91  DEM. REP. CONGO   1998-  RCD, etc v. govt  
92  DJIBOUTI   1993-94   FRUD  
93  ETHIOPIA   1974-92   Eritrea, Tigray, etc.  
94  ETHIOPIA   1997-  ALF, ARDUF (Afars)  
95  GUINEA BISSAU   1998-99   Mil. faction  
96  LIBERIA   1989-96   NPFL (Taylor), INPFL (Johnson)  
97  MALI   1989-94   Tuaregs  
98  MOZAMBIQUE   1976-95   RENAMO  
99  NIGERIA   1967-70   Biafra  
100  RWANDA   1962-65   Post-rev strife  JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    40 
 
101  RWANDA   1990-  RPF, genocide  
102  SENEGAL   1989-  MFDC (Casamance)  
103  SIERRA LEONE   1991-  RUF, AFRC, etc.  
104  SOMALIA   1981-91   SSDF, SNM (Isaaqs)  
105  SOMALIA   1991-  post-Barre war  
106  SOUTH AFRICA   1983-94   ANC, PAC, Azapo  
107  SUDAN   1963-72   Anya Nya  
108  SUDAN   1983-  SPLA, etc.  
109  UGANDA   1981-87   NRA, etc.  
110  UGANDA   1993-  LRA, West Nile, etc.  
111  ZIMBABWE   1972-79   ZANU, ZAPU  
112  ZIMBABWE   1983-87   Ndebele guer‟s  
       
  Latin America and the 
Caribbean  
   
113  ARGENTINA   1955-55   Mil. coup  
114  ARGENTINA   1973-77   ERP/Montoneros  
115  BOLIVIA   1952-52   MNR  
116  COLOMBIA   1948-62   La Violencia  
117  COLOMBIA   1963-  FARC, ELN, etc  
118  COSTARICA   1948-48   NLA  
119  CUBA   1958-59   Castro  
120  DOMINICAN REP.   1965-65   Mil. coup  
121  EL SALVADOR   1979-92   FMLN  
122  GUATEMALA   1968-96   URNG, various  
123  HAITI   1991-95   Mil. coup  
124  NICARAGUA   1978-79   FSLN  
125  NICARAGUA   1981-88   Contras  
126  PARAGUAY   1947-47   Febreristas, Libs, Comms  
127  PERU   1981-95   Sendero Luminoso  JEMIE 8 (2009) 1    41 
 
 